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Abstract
The dynamic commons problem arises when different groups in society engage in intense re-distributive
activity as a result of an export boom. This paper analyzes the role that institutions play in ameliorating
that problem in the case of coffee and oil in Colombia. The paper presents a model that rationalizes the
existence of a federation of coffee producers that effectively reduces inefficient redistribution to other
sectors of society. According to the empirical evidence we find that domestic coffee prices have been
unaffected by political factors, so that in practice appropriation of coffee rents does not depend on
electoral and partisan cycles. The case of oil is substantially different. Here, rents are claimed by a large
number of divided agents. According to the model, one feasible solution to the dynamic commons
problem when the fiscal structure is not unitary is to impose a set of rules that restrict appropriations by
different groups during windfalls. The major cost of this solution, embodied in the Oil Stabilization Fund,
is the total loss of flexibility.4
1 Introduction
Colombia’s exports are heavily concentrated in oil and coffee. In 1996, oil exports were close to
US$ 3 billion (25% of total exports of goods), while coffee exports amounted to US$ 1.7 billion (20% of
the total). In addition, due to taxation of export revenues, there is a strong relationship between public
finances and export performance. In this context, export revenues can be thought of as an inadequately
priced common resource subject to over-utilization. Thus, a “tragedy of the commons” may arise if
property rights over those revenues are ill defined or cannot be enforced
1. In particular, different groups
from society would lobby for additional spending programs whose benefits they can internalize.
However, the costs of such behavior take the form of under-investment, and are borne by society as a
whole. The literature has shown that this form of common access results in over-consumption and lower
economic growth
2.
In an inter-temporal setting the commons problem takes other dimensions that are worth
mentioning. When the terms of trade improve, or new discoveries are made (as in the case of oil) it is
optimal to save part of the boom in order to spread increased consumption over time. This would certainly
be the prediction of a representative agent model when the duration of the shock is uncertain. In practice,
however, there is a tendency for the additional resources to be consumed immediately, as powerful groups
within society attempt to appropriate the windfall. In fact, what is observed is that associated with the
boom there is an increase in re-distributive activity. Since groups fear that others will appropriate the
windfall, they engage in intense lobbying in order to capture the resources themselves. This is known as
the dynamic commons problem.
We argue that this problem is more severe in a country highly dependent on state-controlled
primary commodity exports, such as oil and coffee. Citizens feel entitled to a share of those revenues,
especially during periods of external booms, posing obstacles for the implementation of an inter-
                                               
1 Typical examples are cattle grazing in common pastures or vessels fishing in a lake.
2 See, for example, Tornell and Velasco (1992).5
temporally consistent fiscal policy. In sum, the difficulty to define property rights is compounded by the
volatility in export revenues.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role that institutions have played in the amelioration of
the tragedy of the commons in Colombia. We look at institutions that limit discretionary redistribution by
imposing checks and balances on the use of oil and coffee export revenues. In particular, we analyze the
National Federation of Coffee Growers (hereafter the Federation) as well as the Oil Stabilization Fund
(hereafter the OSF). These are similar institutions in that they both try to limit redistribution and over-
consumption of export earnings. However, they differ in their design. The operation of the OSF is defined
by rules that leave no room for flexibility. The Federation is an autonomous agency that manages the
National Coffee Fund (NCF), a stabilization fund which has been relatively insulated from lobbying by
special interests. Contrary to the OSF, the NCF has retained flexibility -which is valuable given the
volatility in world coffee markets.
In this sense, the paper can be viewed as an attempt to illustrate the choice between rules and
flexibility in the design of institutions. Using a model, we show why rules are preferred to discretion
when there are many competing groups, as in the case of oil. When there are fewer agents the opposite
may be true. In fact, it may be possible to push-out the frontier of feasible combinations of flexibility and
credibility by delegating authority to an autonomous agency
3. If reputation is acquired throughout time, as
in the case of Federation of coffee producers, then discretion is even more favorable.
As we will see in detail, in 1978 the Federation and the NCF became less autonomous from the
government. Consequently, the paper also tests for the effects of changes in the degree of autonomy on
the ability to prevent redistribution and over-consumption of coffee revenues. In addition, we test for the
possibility of political interference on coffee producers’ taxation. Interestingly, the evidence suggests that
electoral and partisan cycles have played no role in the redistribution of coffee export revenues to other
groups. Indeed, the only episode of political interference is associated with an increase in domestic prices,
                                               
3 On the tension between credibility and flexibility, and its implications for institutional design, see Levy and Spiller
(1994).6
in an effort to gain political support from coffee producers during the last months in power of Rojas-
Pinilla´s military regime in the late 1950s.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses in detail the institutional design of the
Federation, the National Coffee Fund, and the Oil Stabilization Fund. Section 3 presents a model that
rationalizes the existence of these institutions. The model captures the nature of the game that leads to a
dynamic commons problem, and provides a framework where institutions, such as the Federation and the
Oil Stabilization Fund, arise endogenously. Section 4 discusses the empirical evidence for coffee. In
particular, we find that political factors have not played a major role in the appropriation of coffee rents
by other groups in society. In contrast, Section 5 illustrates the tendency for over-consumption of oil
rents. The paper ends with a brief section of conclusions.
2 Institutional Aspects
2.1 Coffee
Production of coffee in Colombia is based on a peasant smallholder economy. Producers are
organized around the National Federation of Coffee Growers, a powerful institution created in 1927
4.
Analysts agree that the Federation is not just a producers' association. For instance, Urrutia (1983) argues
that the Federation forms a parallel state with its own sources of legitimacy since producers'
representatives at all levels are elected by direct vote and for relatively long periods of time (so they deal
both with booms and busts and embody the will to stabilize).
                                               
4 The are different views on the origins of the Federation. Bates (1997) has argued that politicians from the coffee
regions were instrumental in the creation of the Federation due to their interest in the revenues derived from the
coffee industry. In his view, local politicians solved the ‘collective action’ problem posed by the fact that small
peasants have weak incentives to organize. However, large coffee producers –opposed to taxation- were also
instrumental in the creation of the Federation. Indeed, the Federation’s first general manager came from
Cundinamarca, a region characterized by large ‘haciendas’.7
The creation of the Federation can be thought of as an effort on the part of coffee producers to
form a solid block in order to prevent redistribution of coffee revenues to other groups of society
5.
Quarrels between the Federation and the government over coffee taxation and export policies, as well as
over exchange rate management have been frequent. For instance, as early as 1935 the government
introduced a new tax in order to pay for the war with Peru. The same government wanted to gain control
over export policy in order to facilitate collusion with Brazil (the world’s largest producer). The
Federation, whose views ultimately prevailed, opposed both initiatives. Negotiations came, however, at a
cost. Previously, coffee growers had elected all members of the  Comité  Nacional, the Federation’s
governing body. This structure changed in 1935: five members of the Comité were to be chosen by the
Coffee Congress and five by the government (ties were to be split by the President). In addition, the
president of the Republic was granted veto power over the appointment of the Managing Director of the
Federation. However, as can be seen in Appendix 1, there have been only three Managing Directors
during the last 60 years. Thus, in practice, governments have not exercised that power.
It is difficult to explain the origin of the powers of the Federation. Interpretations where elites
mobilize the backing of the industry in defense of their interests do not seem to be valid. The Federation
has a democratic structure, where each producer is entitled to one vote favoring the smallholder regions of
the country. Bates (1997) has emphasized the dynamics of party competition in Colombia in order to
understand the emergence of the Federation as an autonomous agency able to restrain pressures from the
government. According to his view, coffee producers in Colombia have been traditionally at the center of
the political spectrum. A candidate willing to win office requires the support of this group, which
therefore has become pivotal in electoral turnouts. In Bates’ words, “[coffee growers] have been able to
make or break governments” even without numerical majority.
                                               
5 In addition, the Federation sought to integrate vertically the coffee industry in Colombia by promoting Colombian
coffee in world markets while locally providing better infrastructure and easier access to credit. These activities
were initially financed with an export tax levied by the government and transferred entirely to the Federation. The
Federation was also granted regulatory powers in relation to the quality of coffee.8
From a different angle, this might give a clue as to why the economic platforms of political
parties (liberal and conservative) have converged in order to capture the representative median voter (i.e.
a typical coffee producer). Consequently, liberals and conservatives adopt similar policies in order to
stabilize the effects of external shocks that are welfare-reducing for the median voter. Not surprisingly,
conservatives and liberals are indistinguishable in regard to economic policies, a point documented by
Escobar (1996). Moreover, this political structure explains the dominant role of the technocracy in
macroeconomic matters. Technocrats and coffee producers have shared similar objectives and have
mutually reinforced their respective powers
6. In sum, Bates’ median voter argument can be useful in
explaining the differences in fiscal policies adopted by Colombia relative to other coffee producing
countries
7.
History has also played a key role in the consolidation of the Federation. The institutional
development of the coffee sector in Colombia has been closely related to its export strategy. In 1940,
when the Federation decided to cooperate with Brazil in an effort to control world prices, the National
Coffee Fund (NCF) was created. The Fund was provided with some initial capital and the proceeds of
coffee taxation in order to purchase and withhold coffee. In a way, the Fund became a tool in order to
impose an optimal tax on exports, allowing the country to achieve the first-best outcome.
The Fund explicitly became an instrument for the stabilization of producers' incomes after the
collapse in world prices in 1958. In order to smooth out consumption, producers have been willing to
make a contribution to the Fund
8. To avoid free-riding problems, these contributions have taken the form
of a tax enforced by the government who, in turn, has the incentive to redirect resources to other groups in
                                               
6 In a recent paper, Junguito (1996) argues that the Federation will lose part of its weight in the formulation of
macroeconomic policies as a result of the loss of importance of coffee within the Colombian economy.
7 Along similar lines, Urrutia (1991) has argued that the absence of populism in Colombia is the result of the checks
and balances of the Colombian democracy. In a more recent paper, Urrutia (1996) points out that traditionally the
Minister of Finance has not been a politician, but almost always a professional economist. This has been possible
because of the highly competitive nature of Colombian democracy. Politicians would rather have a technocrat
occupy this ministry than a potential rival, due to the immense power associated with this position.
8 The NCF has also become an automatic fiscal stabilizer by saving during coffee booms and dissaving during busts.
Producers’ price stabilization can be completely undermined from a macroeconomic point of view if there there is
an incentive for politicians and officials with different preferences than those of the farmers to use the board for
redistribution purposes.9
society. As we will see in Section 4, the use of the Fund for stabilization purposes has resulted in greater
taxation of coffee producers (compared with the period before 1958).
Representatives of producers regained majority over the Comité Nacional, the governing body of
the Fund, in 1958. This structure was again changed during the coffee boom of the late 1970s. In fact,
since 1978 government officials (led by the Minister of Finance who has veto power over most decisions)
and producers have equal representation on the Comité. Negotiations between the two groups are centered
on the price paid to domestic producers.
2.2 Oil
In spite of the fact that oil production has a long history in Colombia (the first concession was
granted in 1905), exports have been significant only since 1987. Although the level of oil reserves is still
low, projections indicate a rapid increase in production (and exports) in the coming years. In fact, the
production of oil will increase from an average of 450,000 barrels per day (bpd) during the first half of the
1990s to nearly 900,000 (bpd) by the turn of the century. Oil export revenues will also double, from
approximately US$2 billion to US$4 billion. However, it is likely that the increase in oil exports will be
of a temporary nature. Recent projections indicate oil exports will fall after 2001, provided that no major
new discoveries are made
9.
Fiscal contributions of the oil industry are based on a complex system of royalties and special
contributions. According to the most recent legislation, royalties amount to 20% of production and are
distributed among the producing departments (47.5%), the producing municipalities (12.5%), the
municipalities where exporting harbors are located (8.0%), and the National Royalties Fund (NRF)
10
                                               
9 See Fedesarrollo-Analdex (1996).
10 This Fund was created in 1994 and is administered by the National Royalties Commission formed by
representatives of the national and the local governments. The Commission, which is presided by the Minister of
Energy, allocates the proceeds of the Fund which have amounted to over 0.2% of GDP in 1995 and 1996 (nearly
US$200 million). The funds are assigned to regional projects, mainly in mining, environment, and transportation
infrastructure.10
(32.0%). In addition, the dividends of Ecopetrol (the State owned company) as well as other forms of
direct and indirect taxation accrue to the National Government.
In light of the potentially destabilizing effects of an oil boom, the Colombian Congress approved
in 1995 the creation of Oil Stabilization Fund (OSF). In contrast to the NCF, which is a tool for private




Revenues derived from the production and export of coffee and oil are subject to the dynamic
commons problem. Oil rents have several powerful shareholders, such as the national government, the
local governments, the state-owned oil company, as well as special interest groups. These shareholders
behave as if they were more impatient than society, so that excessive appropriation of those rents
diminishes economic growth.
In the case of coffee, production takes place in a decentralized fashion by a large number of small
growers. They are organized around one institution (i.e. the Federation) which embodies the preferences
of the representative producer. Powerful groups within society (including the government) attempt to
appropriate and dissipate windfalls. This, again, is an example of the dynamic commons problem.
Existing institutions in Colombia try to solve the dynamic commons problem associated with
coffee and oil revenues in quite distinct ways
12. In relation to coffee, the arrangement favors the formation
of a unified block of coffee producers. In this case it has been possible to retain flexibility, while the
                                               
11 The saving mechanism is rather complex and starts from the definition of a basic monthly income of US$ 15
million for a production unit (i.e. an oil field). The distribution of that basic revenue is: Ecopetrol (US$9.3 m.); NRF
(US$2.1 m.); producing departments (US$2.3 m.); producing municipalities (US$0.5 m.); harbor municipalities
(US$0.34 m.); and, non-producing departments (US$0.22 m.). These values are adjusted annually according the
U.S. CPI inflation. Two concepts are critical in order to understand the saving mechanism. First, the “additional
revenue” (of each recipient), defined as the difference between actual revenues and the basic monthly income.
Second,  “average additional revenue”, defined as the historic average of the additional revenue. In separate
accounts for each recipient and for each production unit, the OSF saves the difference between the additional
revenue and the average additional revenue. When that difference is negative, the OSF dissaves by reimbursing the
difference.
12 One similarity, however, is that Congress has no role in the management of these institutions.11
inability to unify shareholders of oil rents has resulted in an arrangement that favors rules (commitment).
Weekly meetings between representatives of coffee producers and government officials determine the
management of coffee revenues. In the case of oil, automatic clauses stated in the law leave no room for
discretion. In this sense, one could characterize the National Coffee Fund as a flexible instrument were
outcomes (the amount of redistribution and the degree of stabilization of domestic prices) are the result of
two-player (government vs. producers represented by the Federation) game. On the other hand, the Oil
Fund imposes strict rules for mandatory savings by the different recipients of oil rents (Ecopetrol, the
Royalties Fund, plus the territorial governments). The cost, of course, is a reduction in the ability of the
instrument to accommodate unforeseen circumstances. However, this might be a reasonable price to pay
in order to reach a cooperative solution, which otherwise would be difficult to achieve given the large
number of players involved.
Indeed, the key in determining the optimal design of the institution is related to the nature of the
fiscal process. When there are many heterogeneous agents competing for resources, as in the case of oil, it
is difficult retain flexibility. That is probably the reason why the Colombian institutional design favors
rules when the problems created by divided fiscal structures become more severe.
In the next section we develop a model where strict rules are optimal when there is a large
number of groups. These rules try to replicate the first-best outcome by restricting the appropriation of
resources by different groups. Conversely, discretion seems to yield better outcomes than commitment
when there are fewer players. In other words, unitary fiscal structures lessen the anomalies associated
with the commons problem.
3  The Model
3.1 The Dynamic Commons Problem: Basic Framework
As is well known, a common resource can be accumulated too slowly or appropriated too
quickly as competing groups struggle for it. Over-consumption is then sub-optimal from the12
point of view of welfare, especially if that common resource is an input into growth. In this
section, we illustrate that basic point by presenting a model that follows closely Lane and Tornell
(1996). We consider a one-sector growth model where agents have common access to the
aggregate capital stock. We can think of this stock as coffee trees or oil reserves. Production
takes place through a linear technology that uses that stock as the only productive factor. In turn,
production is exported in exchange for a consumption good that can be appropriated by different
groups in society. Specifically, the accumulation equation is given by







where K(t) is the aggregate capital stock and cj(t) is the consumption or appropriation by group j (j = 1,…,
n). a can be thought of as the marginal product of capital or, alternatively, as the terms of trade, i.e. the
price of oil (coffee) in terms of the consumption good. Implicitly, equation (1) assumes that groups do not
have access to a private accumulation technology. Thus, their appropriation is consumed immediately.
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where s is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and d is the rate of time preference or subjective
discount rate. We will impose the following restrictions
s d a > > > 0 1 0 , , ,          >0, n (3)
         ( ) K t t ‡ ‡ 0 0 ,     (4)
The condition on the value of  s ensures that the second-order conditions are satisfied. The second
condition in equation 3 indicates that there are multiple groups. The other restrictions are standard.
Equation (4) simply sets the constraint on the capital stock to be nonnegative. A solution is found by
postulating that consumption policies are linear functions of the capital stock,  ( ) ( )  , t K x t c j
*
j = where xj’s13
are undetermined coefficients. However, a restriction must be imposed in order to prevent each group
from consuming the entire stock of capital at one point in time. This is given by
( ) ( ) ( ) xK t c t xK t h £ £ , (5)
where  ( ) t K x  is larger than the equilibrium appropriation. This setting captures the main features of the
dynamic commons problem. It allows for multiple groups to compete strategically in the redistribution of
oil and coffee revenues, while its intertemporal structure assures that each group is concerned with growth
(future consumption). In fact, groups save even if that enhances the possibility that other groups increase
their appropriation.
One possible solution to this dynamic game among n groups is given by the Markov perfect
equilibrium (MPE), which is derived in Appendix 2. According to this solution concept, the optimal value
of xi is given by,
[ ] x x i i
j i
* * [ ] = - - +
„ ￿ a s ds 1 (6)




 as the return on the common asset net of appropriations
by the other n-1 groups. That is, i’s rate of return is a negative function of the sum of appropriations by
other n-1 groups. When that sum increases and s < 1, the income effect dominates the substitution effect,
so that i’s appropriation rate falls. The opposite happens when s > 1.
Note that (6) forms a system of system of n linearly independent equations in n unknowns. The
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which is simply the solution to  [ ] x n x
* * [ ( ) ] = - - - + a s ds 1 1 . Consequently, the optimal
consumption for every group is
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so that the equilibrium is symmetric. Substituting (8) in the accumulation equation (1) we get the
equilibrium path of aggregate capital
13
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We now compare this allocation to the first best solution obtained by a central planner that
maximizes (2) subject to the accumulation equation ( ) ( ) & ( ) K t K t nc t i = - a  and constraints (3) and (4).
This is identical to the Ramsey problem where consumption is given by
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(fb denotes de first best). In turn, the equilibrium path of aggregate capital is given by
14
( ) ( ) [ ][ ] K t K s e
t s * =
- - s a d . (11)
To recapitulate, when there are multiple groups competing for a common capital stock each
group’s marginal propensity to consume (and appropriate) is too high compared to the case where groups
consume only out of their individual capital. That is,





































                                               
13 Moreover, note that equation (9) implies that K(t) ‡ 0 (t ‡ 0), satisfying one of the constraints imposed in (4).
Second order conditions must be satisfied for (8) and (9) to be indeed an equilibrium. Given the restrictions imposed
in (5), and the linearity (on ci and K) of the accumulation equation (1), it turns out that second order conditions are
ensured as long as the utility function is strictly concave (i.e., as long as s > 0).
14 In this case the transversality condition is ensured if and only if a s ds ( ) 1 0 - + > .15
Thus, the existence of powerful groups leads to a reduction in growth relative to the first best.
Note that one can replicate the first best if n=1. Alternatively, the first best solution can be achieved if
groups act cooperatively and delegate consumption decisions to a central planner.
3.2 Extensions
As can be readily observed from equation (13) the growth rate of the stock of capital in this
economy depends on the number of groups that compete for the common access resources. In particular,
¶
¶
s a s ds
s










is negative for s ˛ (0,1]. Thus, the rate of growth falls as the number of groups becomes larger, reflecting
that total appropriations (n · x
*) are increasing in n. That is, 
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s ˛ (0,1].
The point is clear: Growth falls relative to the first best when there are several groups competing
for the common capital stock. In fact, things can be even worse if we assume as is common in the growth
literature that each group becomes more impatient to consume (an appropriate) as the number of groups
increases. In other words, the risk of other groups increasing their consumption induces greater
impatience. In particular, one can think of the disco unt rate as increasing in n (g>0).
d d g = + lnn . (15)
Clearly, in this case increases in n cause a larger contraction in growth than before (and a larger
increase in total appropriation). This framework is useful for the analysis of windfalls, such as an increase
in the terms of trade or a discovery of new oil reserves. In either case the windfall can be captured by an
increase in a, which reflects more consumption opportunities for the same stock of capital. The effect a















which is positive for s ˛ (0,1]. However, even if appropriations increase, the rate of growth does not
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Clearly, equation (17) yields positive values if s ˛ (0,1]. However, it is possible that an increase in the
raw rate of return (a) results in a perverse effect on growth when there is a more than proportional
increase in aggregate redistribution. This case is known in the literature as the voracity effect and is
associated with s > -
n
n 1 . We are ruling out this possibility by assuming s ˛ (0,1]
15.
The voracity effect is in sharp contrast with the results of the first best case (where groups






= > 0, (18)
so that the increase in economic growth (after a windfall) is always larger under the first best solution.
3.3 Simulations
In this section we try to replicate the Colombian economy by assigning some plausible values to
the parameters used in the model. Based on estimates by Barrios et al. (1993) for the historical capital-
output ratio in Colombia we set a = 0.5. We use a value of s equal to 0.8, which is higher than the
estimate (0.588) obtained by Ogaki, Ostry and Reinhart (1996). We arbitrarily set d = 0.05, in line with
the calibrated parameters of Suescún (1996). Figure 1 plots the appropriation rates (x) for n = 1,....,100.
Clearly, the appropriation rate by each group tends to decrease as the number of competing groups
increases. However, the overall appropriation (n · x
*) increases with the number of groups (Figure 2).17
That is precisely why the growth rate of the economy decreases with the number of groups (Figure 3).
Indeed, the growth rate of the economy becomes negative for n sufficiently large. That is, when the
number of groups is relatively large, their total appropriations exceed total output (export revenues). The
figures also plot the first best case as a benchmark. Clearly, appropriations are higher and growth rates
lower as a result of the dynamic commons problem. In addition, the figures include the case where the
discount rate depends on the number of groups. In particular we assume that  d = + 005 002 . . lnn, so
that the discount rate is equal to 0.142 when n=100. In this case redistribution increases rapidly in n so
that economic growth turns negative for n > 6.
                                                                                                                                                      
15 However, it is possible that individual groups have greater values of s than the representative agent does, which is
the value often used in empirical macroeconomic models. This makes the voracity effect more likely.
Figure 1
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n18
The logical question that arises is how to replicate the first best solution when there are several
groups. One possibility is to try to reduce the number of groups that take part in the game. In practice, this
may have been the approach implicitly used in the case of coffee in Colombia. By effectively reducing the
number of relevant players to two, economic growth has been higher than with more players.
In the case of oil, it has been harder to reduce the number of players. As discussed above, the
nature of the political process, combined with the degree of fiscal decentralization, has resulted in a
divided fiscal structure. Rather than creating an institution similar to the Federation, restrictions have
been imposed on the appropriations by all groups that receive oil rents. We can think of this as a case
where the central planner limits the amount of consumption, which is equivalent to a forced savings
mechanism. Ideally, one would like to restrict appropriations to the point where they mimic the first best
allocation. In particular, it would be optimal to design a stabilization fund that has access to the
accumulation technology captured by equation (1). The stabilization fund will in turn tax the
appropriation by each group to the point where the after-tax appropriation is identical to the first best
allocation. Given equation (12) we can express the tax rate (t) as:
( )
( ) ( )


































*=0.05 +0.002 ln n19
Note that the proceeds of the fund will become part of the common access capital stock. Figure 4 plots the
optimal tax rate, which is an increasing function of a windfall (an increase in a results in an increase in
the optimal tax). That is,  ( )
( )




















 for s ˛ (0,1].
  Clearly, commodity booms should generate greater limits on the appropriation by each group
16.
The analysis of this section has shown that the dynamic commons problem can be solved in different
ways. One possibility is to reduce the number of groups that compete in society, so that in practice,
consumption decisions resemble that of a central planner. Creating strong institutions that embody the
preferences of the representative agent can do this. Alternatively, when it is difficult to reduce the number
of groups, the government can restrict the appropriation by each group. This is similar to imposing a tax
that lowers consumption and increases capital accumulation. Essentially, this framework rationalizes the
experience with coffee and oil in Colombia. In the next section, we analyze whether the existence of the
Federation (of coffee producers) has resulted in lower redistribution and higher growth.
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4 Empirical Evidence: Coffee
This section tests whether the existence of the Federation has resulted in lower redistribution of
coffee revenues to other sectors of society, compared to what is observed in countries where the
institution does not exist. This hypothesis is supported by the evidence in Figure 5, which shows the
central government’s deficit for a group coffee producing nations. Interestingly, Colombia was the only
country with a fiscal surplus during the coffee boom of the late 1970s. Cote d’Ivoire, a country with
heavy redistribution of coffee rents, experienced the largest deficit
17.
Figure 5
Average Fiscal Deficit (as % of GDP) of Selected Coffee Producing Countries Before, during and
after 1975-1978 Coffee boom
We will also look at the evolution of coffee taxation and redistribution in Colombia throughout
time, and test for possible effects of institutional and political variables, such as changes in the
composition of the Comité Nacional, the proximity of elections, or changes in the ruling political party.
The idea is to evaluate the degree of autonomy of the institution.
                                               
17 As shown in Cárdenas (1994), Côte d'Ivoire is an interesting example where the control of the central government
over a similar institution results in a procyclical pattern of fiscal expenditures. In a series of papers about Kenya,
Bevan, Collier and Gunning (1987 and 1989) have argued that, in spite of farmers’ ability to save, the fiscal sector
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Figure 6 plots the monthly domestic and world coffee prices (both in constant 1996 US dollars)
during the period 1946-1996. A cursory look at the graph indicates that domestic coffee prices have been
lower than world coffee prices. In some years, part of the difference between world and domestic prices
has been used for the purchase of excess production over exports, so that strictly speaking not all that
differential is equivalent to taxation of coffee producers at each point in time.
However, periods of accumulation of stocks are followed by periods of dis-accumulation so that
on average the change in inventories has been very small. According to the financial statements of the
National Coffee Fund, the cummulated change in coffee stocks from 1968 until 1996 has been equal to
0.14 percentage points of GDP (Appendix 3). In this sense, it is accurate to consider the average
4.1 Stylized Facts
Figure 6
World and Domestic coffee Prices

































































differential between world and domestic prices as the average degree of coffee taxation. The fact that this
average differential has been positive implies that there has been on average some form of redistribution.
Figure 7 shows the deviations from the trend values in world and domestic prices
18. Clearly, since
1958 domestic coffee (producers’) prices have been more stable than world prices, reflecting the use of
the National Coffee Fund for stabilization purposes. However, the larger degree of stability in domestic
prices has resulted in greater taxation. Indeed, as Figure 8 shows, producers’ taxation increased
permanently after 1958
19.  In other words, stabilization requires more involvement by the government,
which has come at a cost for coffee producers.  Figure 9 compares the degree of producers’ price
stabilization among a group of six producing nations (all of them produce similar qualities). The
coefficient of variation in domestic prices is lowest for Colombia, while the average taxation is
comparable to the other countries. This would suggest that producers’ price stabilization in Colombia has
been achieved without major costs in terms of redistribution, relative to other countries.
                                               
18 In order to define the ‘permanent’ level of the variables we used the Hodrick-Prescott filter, which takes out their
cyclical or high frequency information and leaves their long-run (low-frequency) properties.
19 New tools for coffee taxation where introduced in 1958 in order to perform the stabilization objective. However,
this measure of coffee taxation is certainly overestimated since marketing costs have not been added to the domestic
price.23
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External and Internal Prices in Selected Coffee Producing Countries (Annual Average 1973-1994)
4.2 Econometric Results
where P
c is the producers' price in nominal domestic currency, P
*c is the nominal world price expressed in
dollars, E is the nominal exchange rate ($ per US$), and a is the share of world prices paid to domestic
producers. One can think of a as one minus the ad-valorem export tax (the discussion generalizes to any
form of taxation), which is equivalent to the appropriation of coffee export revenue by coffee producers.
To start, it is convenient to state the relationship between world and domestic prices as:


































































































































































































































































































































































Dividing equation (20) by the domestic country's CPI, and multiplying and dividing by the US
CPI, we can write (after differentiating),




t t = + + a (21)
where a circumflex denotes percentage rate of change and lowercase letters denote real magnitudes.
Therefore, it is possible to express the growth in domestic real coffee prices as the sum of the growth in
world real coffee prices plus the rate of real depreciation of the domestic currency, plus the percentage
change in the share received by producers. In other words, producers’ stabilization can come through
changes in the real exchange rate or changes in the share received by producers.
Based on equation (21) we measure the effect of changes in real world coffee prices and changes





















where n is a lag in the response of domestic prices to changes in world prices, d59-96 is a dummy
variable that takes a value of 1 from 1959 to 1996 and d67-96 takes a value of 1 between 1967 and 1996.
These variables capture some of the institutional changes mentioned above. Since the end of 1958 the
National Coffee Fund has deliberately pursued a stabilization objective. Therefore, we contend that
producers’ price stabilization has been more successful since 1959. This would imply that changes in
domestic prices are less sensitive to changes in world prices since 1959. The dummy variable that is
interacted with the real exchange rate regime captures the fact that before 1967, under a fixed rate system,
an exchange rate differential was in place. Coffee exports were paid a lower (i.e. more appreciated) rate
20.
In 1967 exchange rates were unified. Clearly, endogeneity problems may arise if the real exchange rate
depends on world and domestic coffee prices. However, according to the Hausman test, exogeneity is not
rejected when first differences of the variables are used.
                                               
20 According to Fedesarrollo (1978) an exchange rate differential was adopted during the devaluation of 1951,
eliminated in 1955, readopted in 1958, and terminated in 1967.26
Table 1 D E P E N D E N T  V A R I A B L E   :
% Changes in Domestic Prices
t-statistic in parenthesis
Equation 1 Equation 2
1946:01-1996:12 1941-1996
(monthly data) (annual data)
LS LS



















(1.88) * (3.25) ***




Durbin Watson 1.9839 2.3969
F-statistic 25.734 30.506
Observations 607 56
(*)significance level : 10%
(**) significance level: 5%
(***) significance level: 1%
  Column 1 in Table 1 shows the estimation of equation (22) based on 607 monthly observations
for the period 1946:06 to 1996:12. The regression uses a measure of the real exchange rate constructed
with the higher nominal exchange rate applicable to imports. Interestingly, the results indicate that a 1%
change in real world prices (that lasted more than three months) was associated between 1946 and 1958
with a 0.69% increase in real producers’ prices. Since January 1959 the impact on domestic prices (of a
similar increase in world prices) has fallen to 0.10%. In regard to the real exchange rate, the regression
shows that a 1% real devaluation resulted in a 0.14% increase in domestic prices between 1946 and 1966.27
Thus, the use of multiple exchange rates effectively isolated producers’ prices from changes in the real
(imports) exchange rate during that period. Between 1967 and 1991 the effect increased to 0.46%, so that
changes in the real exchange rate had a major impact on producers’ prices.
Column 2 in Table 1 presents the results of estimating a similar equation with yearly data for the
period 1941-1996. In this regression the lagged dependent variables have been omitted. The estimation
indicates that on average a 1% change in real world coffee prices has been reflected in 0.52% change in
real domestic prices. The results do not confirm the presence of a significant change in the degree of
stabilization after the reform to the National Coffee Fund in 1958.
4.3 Political Influence in Coffee Policy
The analysis of the previous section has identified the fundamental determinants of producers’
prices in Colombia. In this section we explore other determinants, possible reflecting political interference
in the choice of real domestic coffee prices. First, we test for the impact of the change in the composition
of the Comité Nacional in 1978 when producers lost majority. As can be seen in Figure 8 average
producers’ taxation has been 2 percentage points higher since then. However, the degree of stabilization
has remained intact. In fact, when a dummy variable after 1978 interacted with the change in world prices
is added to the regressions of Table 1, the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant.
Second, we follow the political business cycle literature (e.g., Nordhaus (1975), Lindbeck (1975)
and  McRae (1977)) in order to argue that elections are preceded by expansionist policies aimed at
stimulating the economy and followed by contractions intended to lower inflation. In our particular
context, this would imply that real producers’ prices are increased prior to elections, in order to boost
economic activity. This could happen even in models with rational agents (see Rogoff and Sibert (1988),
Rogoff (1987) and Cukierman-Meltzer (1986)). We also test the partisan cycles hypothesis, developed by
Hibbs (1977, 1987)
21, to see whether liberal and conservative governments have different preferences
                                               
21 Alesina (1988) and  Alesina and  Sachs (1988) provide models where agents are rational and politicians are
ideologically motivated and have partisan objectives.28
regarding producers’ prices. We define governments as liberal or conservative according to the political
affiliation of the President (Appendix 1 shows the list of Colombian Presidents and their political
affiliation since 1934).
In order to test for political interference we added the following dummy variables to equation 22.
In the case of the partisan cycles hypothesis we included the variable dumcoli which takes a value of 1
during liberal governments and –1 during conservative administrations (0 during the military regime
between 1953 and 1957
22). Alternatively, we also used dumcons and dumlib which take a value of 1
during conservative and liberal administrations, respectively (and 0 otherwise).
In testing for political business cycles we added the variable dumelect which takes a unitary value
in the six months preceding the presidential elections and 0 otherwise. Also, the variable dumnord which
takes a value of 1 in the first year of each government and 1 in the last year (0 otherwise) was tested.
Finally, other political factors specific to Colombia were taken into account by introducing the variable
drojas which takes a unitary value during the last six months before the fall in Rojas’ military regime in
1957.
Table 2 shows the results when these political variables are added to the basic equation.
Interestingly enough, the dummy variable that captures the last-minute populist policies of General Rojas-
Pinilla is the only variable that comes out significant in the regressions. Indeed, real coffee prices were
increased at a rate of 6.5% per month during his last semester in power. No other political variables seem
to have affected the determination of producers’ real coffee prices. Controlling for the fundamentals -
world prices and the real exchange rate-, domestic prices have not responded to electoral or partisan
considerations. Liberal and conservative governments are alike in this regard. In addition, coffee prices
                                               
22 General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla ruled Colombia between June 1953 and May 1957, when a Junta Militar took
charge before handing power back to civilians in 1958. Loosing political support, General  Rojas tried to gain
popularity by expanding the economy during his last months in government.29
have not been used to influence elections. In fact, when we perform an F test that nests all the political
hypotheses we can safely reject their joint significance
23.
TABLE 2




















   constant -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0004 -0.0012 -0.00013 0.000251
(-0.29) (-0.08) (0.17) (-0.59) (-0.07) (0.11)
0.4681 0.4675 0.4666 0.4692 0.4674 0.4690
(7.95) *** (7.93) *** (7.90) *** (7.96) *** (7.93) *** (7.95) ***
-0.3660 -0.3658 -0.3647 -0.3676 -0.3645 -0.3667
(-5.60) *** (-5.59) *** (-5.57) *** (-5.62) *** (-5.57) *** (-5.60) ***
0.2089 0.2083 0.2075 0.2098 0.2083 0.2099
(3.56) *** (3.55) *** (3.53) *** (3.58) *** (3.55) *** (3.58) ***
-0.0559 -0.0554 -0.0545 -0.0570 -0.0547 -0.0564
(-0.87) (-0.87) (-0.85) (-0.89) (-0.85) (-0.88)
0.0506 0.0502 0.0518 0.0504 0.0509 0.0516
(2.11) ** (2.09) ** (2.09) ** (2.10) ** (2.12) ** (21,419.00) ***
0.1564 0.1553 0.1551 0.1561 0.1557 0.1565
(3.71) *** (3.68) *** (3.67) *** (3.70) *** (3.69) *** (3.71) ***
0.3247 0.3074 0.3145 0.3059 0.3202 0.3246
(1.97) ** (3.97) *** (1.90) * (1.83) * (1.95) * (1.97) **
   DRoj 0.0640 0.0636 0.0642 0.0647 0.0636 0.0638
(4.00) *** (4.10) *** (3.91) *** (4.03) *** (3.98) *** (3.99) ***
  AR(1) 0.1336 0.1343 0.1341 0.1343 0.1331 0.1331
(3.19) *** (3.20) *** (3.20) *** (3.20) ** (3.17) *** (3.17) ***
 dumcoli - -0.0014 - - - -
(-0.65)
 dumlib - - -0.0018 - - -
(-0.51)
 dumcons - - - 0.0027 - -
(0.67)
dumelect - - - - 0.0046 -
(-0.74)
dumnord - - - - - -0.0018
(-0.51)
R
2 0.2750 0.2755 0.2753 0.2755 0.2756 0.275304
Durbin Watson 1.9841 1.9844 1.9843 1.9844 1.9839 1.9838
F-statistic 25.159 22.664 22.641 22.666 22.681 22.641
Observations 607 607 607 607 607 607
(*)significance level : 10%
(**) significance level: 5%
(***) significance level: 1%
5 Empirical Evidence: Oil
This section illustrates the tendency for over-consumption of oil rents. The data correspond to the
1984-1996 period. The idea is to capture the problems that motivated the introduction of the Oil
                                               
23 In line with the new versions of Partisan theories where agents are rational we also considered dummy variables
which take a unitary variable only during the first two years of a liberal or conservative government. The assumption30
Stabilization Fund (OSF) in 1995. Unfortunately, the effectiveness of the OSF can not be properly
address with the information available.
Table 3 displays the average annual growth in oil net exports, which is equivalent to the revenues
available for appropriation. These revenues correspond to the value of exports undertaken by the National
Oil Company plus the difference between exports and remittances by private companies operating in
Colombia (under the assumption that this difference is used to pay local costs including taxes). Oil rents
correspond to the resources appropriated by the different levels of the government though a variety of
taxation mechanisms which include the payment of royalties. As can been seen, during the first oil boom
(1984-1990) the percentage growth in those rents was higher than for exports. In other words, the income
elasticity of oil rents was 1.11, reflecting excessive appropriation of export revenues. This is observation
is reinforced by the fact that when oil exports fell (1990-1994) the contraction in oil rents was lower.
Recently, the revenues derived from increasing exports have been appropriated by the State Oil Company
and have not been redirected to other groups in society. However, this form of appropriation also leads to
excessive consumption.
Table 3
Appropriation of Oil Rents
Average Annual Growth: 1984-1990 1990-1994 1994-1996
Oil Net Exports* 120.9% -91.5% 104.2%
Oil Rents 134.0% -83.4% 45.6%
1.Taxes and Contributions 131.0% -86.5% 6.2%
2.Royalties 143.1% -55.7% 64.7%
 -National Government 176.6% -85.1% -100.0%
 -Departments 132.9% -54.1% 63.4%
 -Municipalities 136.0% 68.2% 85.1%
 -Investment Funds and Corporations 146.2% -71.4% -16.4%
 -National Royalties Fund - - 146.2%
* Corresponds to oil exports by Ecopetrol plus (exports - remittances) of foreign companies.
Income Elasticity of*: 1984-1990 1990-1994 1994-1996
Oil Rents 1.11 0.91 0.44
1.Taxes and Contributions 1.08 0.95 0.06
2.Royalties 1.18 0.61 0.62
 -National Government 1.46 0.93 -0.96
 -Departments 1.10 0.59 0.61
 -Municipalities 1.12 -0.75 0.82
 -Investment Funds and Corporations 1.21 0.78 -0.16
 -National Royalties Fund - - 1.40
* Refers to the ratio of the growth rate in oil rents to the growth in oil net exports.
                                                                                                                                                      
is that agents learn who is in charge an are less likely to be affected by the particular preferences of the government.31
Lastly, Figure 10 displays the fiscal accounts of the two largest oil-producing departments in
Colombia. The data compare the increase in current revenues, mainly derived from oil rents, with the
increase in expenditures. Two points can be made. First, the marginal propensity to spend out of oil rents
is higher than one in most episodes. Second, when oil revenues decrease in one single department, the
reduction in expenditures is less than proportional. Later, this leads to fiscal adjustment. The final result is
a large variability in government expenditures and private consumption. Whether the OSF will prevent
this from happening in the future is uncertain. Preliminary evidence suggests that the saving rates
established in the law are incapable of reproducing the optimal inter-temporal allocation of resources.
Figure 10
Fiscal Accounts in the two main Oil—producing Departments
                                                                                                                                                      










































































This paper has analyzed the role that institutions play in ameliorating the dynamic commons
problem in Colombia. The paper presents a model that rationalizes the existence of a federation of coffee
producers that embodies the preferences of the representative producer. The Federation effectively
reduces redistribution of coffee revenues to other sectors of society. However, greater involvement by the
government in the Federation, has resulted in greater taxation of coffee revenues. For example, the
stabilization of prices paid to producers has implied some appropriation of coffee export revenues by
other sectors of society. Interestingly, domestic coffee prices have been unaffected by Colombian politics,
so that in practice appropriation does not depend on electoral and partisan cycles. However, appropriation
of coffee rents has been relatively low. In this sense, the two-player game (between the Federation and the
government) has produced efficient outcomes, in part due to the large degree of flexibility.
The case of oil is substantially different. Here, rents are claimed by a large number of divided
agents so over-consumption has been limited by imposing a forced saving mechanism. According to the
model, this may be the only feasible solution to the dynamic commons problem when the fiscal structure
is not unitary. The major cost of this solution, however, is the total loss of flexibility.33
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Appendix 1: Political Variables
Table A.1: Managing Directors of the Federation
Director Term Political Affiliation
Alfredo Cortazar Toledo Nov. 1927 - Jan. 1930 Liberal
Enrique De Narvaez Jan. 1930 - Dec. 1930 Liberal
Mariano Ospina Pérez Dec. 1930 - Jul. 1934 Conservative
Camilo Sáenz Jul. 1934 - Jan. 1935 Liberal
Alejandro López Nov. 1935 - Jul. 1937 Liberal
Manuel Mejía Jaramillo Aug. 1937 - Feb. 1958 Liberal
Arturo Gómez Jaramillo Feb. 1958 - Dec. 1982 Liberal
Jorge Cárdenas Gutiérrez Jan. 1983 - Conservative
Table A.2: Colombia’s Presidents 1900-1994
President Political Party Presidential Term “Economic” Term
José Manuel Marroquín Conservative 1900-1904 1901-1904
Rafael Reyes Conservative 1904-1909 1905-1908
Jorge Holguín Conservative 1909-1909 1909
Ramón González Valencia Conservative 1909-1910 1910
Carlos E. Restrepo Conservative 1910-1914 1911-1914
José Vicente Concha Conservative 1914-1918 1915-1918
Marco Fidel Suárez Conservative 1918-1921 1919-1921
Jorge Holguín Conservative 1921-1922 1921-1922
Pedro Nel Ospina Conservative 1922-1926 1923-1926
Miguel Abadía Méndez Conservative 1926-1930 1927-1930
Enrique Olaya Herrera Liberal 1930-1934 1931-1934
Alfonso López Pumarejo Liberal 1934-1938 1935-1938
Eduardo Santos Liberal 1938-1942 1939-1942
Alfonso López Pumarejo Liberal 1942-1946 1943-1946
Mariano Ospina Pérez Conservative 1946-1950 1947-1950
Laureano Gómez Conservative 1950-1952 1951-1952
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla Military 1953-1957 1953-1956
Junta Militar Military 1957-1958 1957-1958
Alberto Lleras Camargo* Liberal 1958-1962 1959-1962
Guillermo León Valencia* Conservative 1962-1966 1963-1966
Carlos Lleras Restrepo* Liberal 1966-1970 1967-1970
Misael Pastrana Borrero* Conservative 1970-1974 1971-1974
Alfonso López Michelsen Liberal 1974-1978 1975-1978
Julio César Turbay Ayala Liberal 1978-1982 1979-1982
Belisario Betancur Cuartas Conservative 1982-1986 1983-1986
Virgilio Barco Vargas Liberal 1986-1990 1987-1990
César Gaviria Trujillo Liberal 1990-1994 1991-1994
Ernesto Samper Pizano Liberal 1994- 1995-
* Presidents during the “Frente Nacional”36
Appendix 2: Model Solution
At each point in time, each group chooses a consumption sequence {ci(t)} in order to maximize
equation (2) subject to the accumulation equation (1), restrictions (3) through (5), and the strategies
followed by the other n-1 groups. One possible solution to this dynamic game among n groups is given
the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), which restricts strategies to be just functions of payoff relevant
state variables. In this solution concept strategies are not allowed to be history dependent.
A Markov strategy for group i is a consumption sequence {ci(t)} which is a function only of the payoff
relevant state variable:  K(t). An  n-tuple of  Markov strategies  { ( ( ))}
* c K t j j
n
=1forms a MPE if it is a
subgame perfect equilibrium for every realization of K(t). That is, if





* ‡ " , ,     (A1)
where  c c c c c -i
*
i i n = - + ( ,...., , ,....., ) 1 1 1 and  J(.,.) is the value taken by the payoff function given by
equation (2). Following Lane and Tornell (1996), finding a MPE for the game is identical to finding the
solution to a set of n Hamiltonian problems (one for each group) of the form (in present value terms):























where ci is the control variable, K is the state variable, and lie
-dt is the costate variable. In solving for
group’s i problem the consumption policies of the other n-1 groupsc K t j
*( ( ))  are treated as functions of
the state. In turn, these policies correspond to the solution of analogous problems. Therefore, the MPE
corresponds to the set of n  consumption sequences  { ( ( ))}
* c K t j j
n
=1that simultaneously solve n
Hamiltonian problems like (A2). A solution is found by postulating that consumption policies are linear
functions of the state,
( ) ( ) c t x K t j , ,n j
*
j = = ,      1K (A3)
where xj’s are undetermined coefficients. Substituting this guess in (A2) we then find the values of the n
undetermined coefficients that simultaneously solve the n Hamiltonian problems. Thus, we find a set of n37
strategies that are best responses to one another. As usual, the first order conditions that solve the
maximization problem for group i are given by (* denotes an optimal value):
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] c t t t t i i i i
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t K t t e ﬁ¥
- = l
d 0 (A6)
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) m m i i i t xK t c t t - = ‡
* , 0 0      (A7)
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) m m t c t xK t t i
* , - ‡             0 (A8)
There are three MPE associated with these first order conditions: an interior equilibrium and two
extreme equilibria. We will concentrate in the former where appropriations are kept within the bounds
defined by equation (5). Since in this equilibrium equation (5) is not binding it follows that
( ) ( ) m m t t j = = 0for all  i and  t.  To find and equilibrium candidate we look for the n  strategies
{ ( ),...., ( )} c t c t n 1 that simultaneously solve the n set of equations given by (A4) and (A5). Later we will
check that the transversality condition (A6) is indeed satisfied. To derive the unknown coefficients in
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Substituting equations (1) and (A5) in (A9) one gets that the undetermined coefficients must satisfy
[ ] [ ] x x i j n i i
j i
* * , , , , = - + - - =
„ ￿ a s ds s 1 1 1      K . (A10)
which can be rewritten as equation (6) in the text.
It turns that as long as xi
* is nonnegative the transversality condition is satisfied. However, not all












0  If s is restricted to the interval (0,1], as is plausible38
for a country like Colombia, then  x
*is nonnegative as long as n > 1, a > 0, and d > 0 (as stated in
equation (3)).





1968 0.01 0.07 -0.07
1969 -0.06 -0.25 0.19
1970 0.45 0.02 0.43
1971 0.16 0.03 0.14
1972 0.45 -0.45 0.90
1973 0.13 0.34 -0.21
1974 -0.06 -0.71 0.65
1975 0.06 -0.35 0.41
1976 1.02 -0.38 1.40
1977 1.41 1.37 0.04
1978 -0.01 0.80 -0.81
1979 1.23 -0.57 1.81
1980 0.84 -0.22 1.07
1981 -0.37 0.76 -1.12
1982 0.06 0.65 -0.58
1983 0.20 0.52 -0.32
1984 0.75 0.49 0.26
1985 1.85 -0.17 2.02
1986 3.37 -0.56 3.94
1987 0.30 -0.91 1.21
1988 1.22 0.39 0.82
1989 0.61 -0.36 0.97
1990 0.16 -0.48 0.64
1991 0.26 0.24 0.02
1992 -0.85 0.23 -1.09
1993 -0.05 -0.12 0.07
1994 0.70 -0.51 1.21
1995 0.50 0.39 0.11
1996 0.06 -0.09 0.15